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TECHCAMP CHILE TO COMBAT THE IMPACT OF DISINFORMATION IN ELECTORAL PROCESSES

Introduction

Chile has one of the most prosperous digital environments in Latin America. With the rise of social media, traditional news, radio and streaming of popular channels, the Chilean population avidly consumes their information digitally. However, the growing threat of disinformation has not metabolized into public knowledge at the same rate. Combining low media literacy, record levels of content, and a historic political transformation in Chile, the time has come for taking innovative action on the fundamental issues affecting democracy in the digital age.

In this context, Fundación Multitudes, together with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, in addition to La Tercera as a media partner, implemented on December 2 and 3, 2021 the TechCamp Chile to Combat the Disinformation in Electoral Processes, as a launching pad to advance the commitments of the Year of Action of the Summit for Democracy, with the aim of creating capacities and generating awareness about the impact of disinformation in electoral processes, particularly when used as a form of violence against women in political life.

Specifically, TechCamp Chile had four specific purposes:

Raise awareness of the threat that fake news and disinformation pose to electoral processes and democracy;
Conduct training sessions and programs that enable members of civil society, academia, the media, the data science and technology sectors, and political circles to identify and combat fake news and disinformation campaigns and mitigate their most negative effects for democracy;
Carry out information exchange sessions between members of different sectors to address the multidimensional nature of disinformation and fake news;
Actively defend the most vulnerable and affected by the threats and attacks of fake news and disinformation in politics. In Chile, women, communities of indigenous peoples, LGBTQ+ communities and young political activists are the most affected by these phenomena of digital violence. The normalization of these phenomena must be reversed, diminished and prevented.

As a result, during two intense days, a total of 34 participants from different sectors of society were trained by 15 trainers on how to combat the effects of disinformation in electoral processes, especially when it is used as a form of gender-based political violence.

Participants’ characterization

Trainers’ characterization

As one of the products of this capacity-building program, this document seeks to present a brief summary of the activities carried out within the framework of TechCamp Chile, as well as a report on the achievements and analysis of the exit survey to visualize the main learnings and results of the program.

Summary of TechCamp Chile Day 1

Lecture 1: Disinformation: Key Concepts and Overview of its Threat to Democracy

Disinformation: Key Concepts and Regulatory Frameworks in Latin America. Vladimir Garay, Director of Advocacy of Derechos Digitales

Disinformation is not a new phenomenon, since the year 1600, even before, it was used as a tactic of war. Likewise, there is no consensus regarding the impact of disinformation, nor a universally accepted definition of what it is, due to the complexity of the phenomenon, since it is related to various aspects of democratic life and develops differently in each society.

As for regulatory frameworks, general prohibitions on the dissemination of disinformation based on imprecise and ambiguous concepts can become a danger to freedom of expression. Restrictions on freedom of expression must be provided for by law, they cannot be subsequent, they must pursue a legitimate purpose that is recognized by international law, and they must be necessary to achieve that purpose.

In 1985, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that a system to control the right of expression for the sake of guaranteeing the correctness and veracity of information violates society’s right to information. However, given the possibility of information produced with “real malice”, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression establishes that it could be sanctioned, but as a subsequent action, and the Inter-American Court establishes a precedent in the Case of Ríos et al. vs Venezuela by pointing out that when ruling on issues of public interest, state authorities must reasonably verify the facts on which their opinions are based with greater diligence than that used by individuals.

At the national level, there are legislative initiatives in various Latin American countries related to the dissemination of false information, in the case of Chile there is the Draft Law for the Regulation of Digital Platforms that incorporates the notion of «manifestly false information», a vague concept, and establishes a standard of strict and absolute liability, a draconian issue that does not exist in other parts of the world.

The solutions to disinformation cannot only be legal, it is important to create conditions so that the different actors in the system can operate better in the information ecosystem.

The Threat of Disinformation to Democracy: Examples of Disinformation in Chile. Tomás Martínez, Founder of Mala Espina Check

In the case of disinformation against the Constitutional Convention, President Elisa Loncón has been the target of this from the first day, with points of viralization when contingent situations occur. For example, in the context of the installation of the Convention, one of the first disinformation campaigns arose with an alleged photograph of the president greeting Augusto Pinochet. In this type of campaign, in addition to disinformation, it enters the field of discrimination against indigenous peoples, gender-based violence, resulting in an intersectionality of vulnerabilities. Campaigns about supposed bonuses and winter vacations, among others, seek to undermine the work of the Constitutional Convention as an institution and of some of its members specifically.

As for disinformation in electoral campaigns, they tend to focus on the candidates who lead the preference polls. Regarding types, it has been observed that they come from the candidates (incorrect figures or data), that they affect other candidates, and can influence the decision of the voters; they refer to the decision to go or not to vote, some examples are that the Armed Forces are not going to guard the polling places (false), or that the Chilean Electoral Service uses Venezuelan software (false), among others; and the dissemination of inaccurate information by the candidates in their public speeches, for example, Gabril Boric about the patrimony of José Antonio Kast, or José Antonio Kats about the countries that are part of the United Nations Security Council.

Disinformation takes loose ends of a true situation, manipulates them, and generates a narrative that confuses citizens. Memes and parodies also generate disinformation, so it is important to counter the narrative they convey.

Disinformation in Electoral Processes in Latin America. Elodie Martínez, Head of Fact-checking for Latin America and Spain at AFP

Agence France-Presse is the world’s leading Fact-Checking agency. In 2017, AFP built the world’s largest fact-checking network in the context of the French presidential election. The team for Latin America and the Caribbean is coordinated from Montevideo, having covered electoral campaigns at all levels and also census campaigns, where disinformation has been observed to weaken democratic institutions.

Some points to discuss about disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean in electoral contexts are the discrediting of male and female candidates with unfounded claims; debates used as disinformation tools; information to insert distrust in the electoral system; and accusations of electoral fraud that lengthen the processes.

As for the candidates, there are publications that are spread for the purpose of humor, memes and parodies, which mislead certain people who do not understand the narrative; there are images or videos that are taken out of context that generate doubts about candidates.

Regarding the public debate, these scenarios are used to deliver biased, simplified, false information, which delays the verification process due to the number of figures published by the candidates, and the need to resort to reliable sources.

Regarding the confusion surrounding the electoral process, disinformation focuses on who can participate, dubious tools, strategies that can invalidate votes, and measures in the context of Covid-19. For example, that there are two election days instead of one, the installation of electronic voting, etc.

As for accusations of fraud, in most cases doubtful situations have an explanation, but it is very difficult for people who are convinced that fraud exists to be rationally convinced otherwise.

Fact-checking is providing elements accessible to the entire population so that each one can issue their own opinion and judgment.

Some measures against disinformation are the teaching of tools to students and fellow journalists, as well as to users; check the speech; establish alliances with the media, electoral bodies, civil society organizations; and establish alliances with platforms on which disinformation circulates.

Capacity Building Sessions 1

Generating Impact through Business and Policy. Carla Dearing, Partner at Velo Group LLC

One model of entrepreneurship is to collect resources and skills before starting, then find a strategic ally to continue the process. Some resources and skills to have before starting the initiatives are:

Personal Related: Corporate; Sales and marketing, customer service, and other personal skills (25% of components).
Related to sales: Sponsors, conferences and promotions.
Marketing Related: Social Media Ads/Ambassadors; video/photo production; press relations; blog content; and design and materials.
Related to technology: Hosting + infrastructure; mobile apps and website development; and corporate website.
Other Resources: Office resources and professional services.

While the barriers to mobile app development have been lowered in recent years, as a simple app can be coded in a single weekend, today for a tech-related venture to be successful, you have to gather the necessary resources mentioned above.

Five truths learned:

Making change requires a lot of money, especially in #FinTech;
Good intentions (and a good brand) are not enough. The business model must work;
The only people who access capital before profits are those with special access, usually not people from vulnerable communities. You must be smarter;
Technology can be used to do all the little things right at low capital cost;
Excellence attracts all the talent, partners and clients one needs for success.

These truths that are identified in the world of entrepreneurship can be applied to the structure of power in public affairs, especially to engage the voices of communities that are usually not represented, such as women.

When women decide to get involved in public life, they must make the decision to be exposed to attacks against their public and private life. The possibility of being elected as authorities is the subject of conversation around their gender identity and not their ability to exercise public office.

There is no easy way to participate in decision processes when you are a woman, so it is better to get involved from the beginning. The recommendation is to start by 1) finding allies (the right people who provide support, believe in the mission, understand the difficulty of participating in politics as a woman) and 2) gathering the resources mentioned above. Starting a political campaign is similar to starting a business.

Silencing women is a form of violence, including situations when a woman questions whether she can be a leader for fear of being attacked.

One strategy to use to deal with attacks on social networks against women who participate in politics is to have a team that monitors the different platforms to identify potential disinformation campaigns against them. Disinformation is one of the reasons why women decide not to participate in politics.

Transmedia Storytelling Tools. María Laura Ruggiero, Narrative Designer and Storyteller, SeirenFilms

In storytelling, stories traditionally have a beginning, middle and end. That still works, but in the digital world it’s applied in layers. Today terms arise that aim to generate experiences; content and platform; attention as the most precious asset; and the interaction that makes the story stop being linear.

Digital storytelling has two sides, the content as a snack and the immersive experience. In the first case, the content is considered a snack, something that is consumed while doing other things, that is, a quick and short consumption that whets the appetite.

In the second case, there are ways to create the immersive experience without using a device, as occurs with series and movies where one loses track of space-time. This depends on the audience and the users, being understood as different actors, since the former are passive while the latter have the possibility of interacting.

Transmedia is storytelling based on the audience, it generates the idea of discovery, it refers both to a system and to the way of regulating the rhythm within it. It involves going through different digital spaces to understand history. Transmedia as a system implies storytelling, audience participation, multiplatform (at least two spaces), connections between content (these must be understood as a whole and individually), expansive and free.

There is a strong connection between users and technology. You must understand the users and who is going to be immersed in the story. Immersion is a construction, it is not something that happens automatically, it is a design of sensory elements, information and interaction that makes the person feel that they are trapped in a story.

Immersive content that requires a technological platform is divided into three forms: VR for virtual reality (created entirely where one can move through space), 360 Video (cameras that record space in 360) and AR for augmented reality (reality mediated through a camera).

In the immersive there is organization of a system, where it is necessary to understand how each element interacts: user, dynamics and history. Based on the characteristics of the user, the dynamics to transmit the story are defined. Think from users, from stories and from dynamics. For example, for users with little internet access, the best way to reach them with activist content may be through short podcasts.

Any technological platform can be used to tell stories. We have the possibility of generating something immersive, understanding users, and telling a different story (for example, using a video game to do activism).

Whenever there is talk of storytelling, especially immersive, there is an emotional journey and a structure that includes the interaction that must be prepared to respond to the unforeseen.

Impact of the Processing of Personal Data on the Dissemination of Information in Political Campaigns. Romina Garrido, Master in Law of New Technologies, University of Chile

Data privacy is a useful tool to reach the right audience, transmit a message in the best way and know who the final recipients are. Privacy is beginning to be seen as a collective right when data is used in decisions that affect an entire community.

Massive data can come from different sources such as thoughts, what is shared on social media, reactions to publications, the devices we use, geolocation, etc. The human being is the greatest creator of data and data is generated every minute.

Traditionally it is said that data is the new oil, but this is a myth because if the data is lost it is difficult to replace it with others. Data are unique characterizers of people.

What is done with the data is descriptive analytics and prescriptive analytics. Both rely on massive aggregate data sets, the difference is what you do with them. In the first, the aggregate data is taken and then statistical models are used to forecast or predict future behavior; and in the second case, the aggregated data is taken and then fed to machine learning algorithms to form a picture of the person’s identity.

In mass data processing, profiling is a form of automated processing of personal data that consists of using these to determine aspects of someone: evaluate or analyze aspects related to professional performance, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behavior, location or movement. The techniques used for this, for example, is microtargeting, which consists of the management of large amounts of data, in which common patterns are sought through selection criteria that consider inclinations, interests, concerns, socioeconomic situation, educational level, age group, etc., with the aim of creating segmentation of the total group.

The Cambridge Analytica Case best exemplifies the impact of data processing on political campaigns. The analysis can be done from 3 axes.

The first is academic and commercial research. In 2012 a Russian professor joined the Pyschometrics Center of the University of Cambridge, who developed a personality test for academic purposes, this professor also had his own company called Global Science Research, one of his clients being SFL, parent of Cambridge Analytica. The “My Personality” test was later taken by the researcher to his company and was called “This is my digital life”. The test, answered by approximately 270,000 people, evaluated 5 personality types: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. When the case explodes, the fine line between academic investigation and commercial investigation becomes apparent.

The second edge is Cambridge Analytica as a political consultancy. It presents itself as a specialist in data collection and analysis for advertising and political campaigns. It is accused of obtaining people’s data from Facebook, against the platform’s security conditions, to frame people based on personality types and send personalized political messages to influence their decision. As a consultant, Cambridge Analytica developed a tool to create psychographic profiles based on data that came from more than 5,000 collection points, including Facebook.

The third edge is Facebook as a business model. User data is the product offered to advertising companies. Until 2015, the Facebook API allowed data backup, so when users answered the personality test, in addition to accepting the processing of their data, they were giving authorization to access the data of their contacts, which means that of the 270 thousand people who responded to the survey, the number of affected users reaches 87 million, of whom Cambridge Analytica had access violating the terms and conditions of Facebook but not the technological tools that the company had. Cambridge Analytica sold the segmentation of profiles for the dissemination of political campaigns, reaching each audience with effective messages.

Related to disinformation in electoral processes, data processing allows the creation of bubbles of disinformation according to the type of person, which can alter their decision intention.

Workshop 1: Tools and Strategies to Monitor Public Debate on Social Media. Dalby Dienstbach & Lucas Roberto Da Silva, Fundação Getulio Vargas

In the case of free tools to analyze and collect data on the main social platforms, there are tools for Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and YouTube (it should be noted that there are also tools for new platforms like TikTok): Crowdtangle (the best way to get data from Facebook), Orange, Socialblade, Gephi (to build graphs) and DMI Tools (gives access to data from various sources such as Wikipedia, YouTube, etc). If you are an independent researcher and/or do not have programming skills, it is recommended to use Orange, DMI Tools and Gephi, to monitor the debate, especially on Twitter; if you want to deepen the investigation and use new methodologies, you need to use Python to have more control of what happens.

Regarding Facebook, it does not have API (Application Programming Interface), access to the data that social media companies grant without having to reserve it in the researchers’ own database. Facebook disabled this option after the Cambridge Analytica scandal, now they grant access to their data only to researchers using the Crowdtangle tool, which requires the institution to be approved (it can take from 2 days to 1 week approximately). Crowdtangle also gives access to data from Reddit and Instagram, in the case of Facebook it does not give data from comments.

In the case of Twitter, access to data is much more open, you have access to historical data and data in real time, but these have limits, for example, with the new API that they are developing, API V2, you only have access to 500,000 tweets per month; likewise, you must apply to gain access.

In the case of YouTube it is different, the API uses different quotas to give access to data. There are some free tools, but the application for permission is reviewed automatically, you can develop your own tools, but they give low levels in the first moments, they can revoke your access if they believe that the research is not valuable to the public and/or the platform.

WhatsApp does not have an API, there is no way to access the data in an official way. There are ethical issues on this platform because you can access data from users who do not know that their information is being used in an investigation, this being the most complex aspect of the investigative process.

As for paid tools, the scope they offer on social media (most offer Twitter, Facebook and Instagram), the volume of data and the possibilities of exporting them (some have limits), access to historical data and analytics capabilities should be considered.

Regarding the research design, it is a step that must be taken before collecting the data. The steps are 1) Define the topic, 2) Explore discourses in courses, 3) Identify strategies, 4) Write the research question (“query”), 5) Validate the research question, and 6) Implement the research question.

In the first step, it is defined what to look for when monitoring, for which research questions, hypotheses, objectives, etc. are constructed. Topics can be events (e.g. elections); topics (e.g. hate speech debates on the internet), actors (e.g. candidates, activists, authorities, companies, state institutions, etc.). Sometimes a category of three must be included in the design, and each can lead to higher topics and subtopics that must also be analyzed.

The second step is to explore the discourse around the chosen topic, that is, what has been said about it. We need to focus on “where” these discourses are taking place and “who” is hosting them. Normally, pages are searched on the internet, such as institutional web pages, social media such as Facebook pages, media platforms.

The third step is to identify linguistic discourse strategies. It focuses on what form the speeches have: «what» is said and «how» what is related to the topic is said. Linguistic decisions must be made, for example, using words, phrases, proper names, slang, hashtags, accounts, etc. The variations that users can use and potential typing errors must be considered.

The fourth step is to write the query, which is a syntax, linguistic element of the investigation. The purpose is to transfer linguistic discourse strategies into syntax that will enable access to information. Search words are combined with logistic operators such as «and», «or», «not», these represent the relationship between two terms. When constructing the syntax, morphological, lexical and semantic principles must be considered, as well as variations and other linguistic aspects; in addition to the moment of the speech and the moment of data collection.

The fifth step is about validating the query, it consists of using different tools to verify that the research objective is met, verify that no word, hashtag, etc. has been ignored, in addition to identifying superfluous data, which is not relevant for research, to think about including or excluding logical connectors. The query serves both to collect data and classify it.

The last step is to implement the query to collect and/or classify the data using different tools, whether paid or free.

Summary of TechCamp Chile Day 2

Conference 2: Disinformation as an Intersection between the Erosion of Democratic Institutions and the Low Participation of Women in the Electoral Processes. Kristina Wilfore, Co-founder of #ShePersisted

In recent years, there has been an evolution in the attacks that women in politics receive, silencing women activists and using technology as weapons to undermine democracy by undermining women. Information has been collected on testimonials from women politicians who have reported attacks to undermine their public agendas across the European Union and parliaments around the world, where disinformation plays a major role.

But the threats that women face online combine multiple edges: on the one hand, you have the sexism and misogyny that is unfortunately normalized in social media, this is also combined with online violence, threats, hate speech and intimidation. Likewise, in recent times disinformation has been increasing, where they have artificial activity and a “weaponization” of it in attacks. Thus, we can say that gender disinformation has these three edges that act simultaneously.

The research that #ShePersisted has been doing shows that there are certain unique characteristics that women have experienced by being women in politics. The first parameters are called “leadership biases”, which take four axes that suggest that women are untrustworthy; incompetent or without the necessary qualifications; unfriendly or disliked for the position; and uncontrollable or erratic. This in turn is positioned in conjunction with sexualized attacks, where only the image of women is transformed into a «meme», causing graphic accusations and in which women are accused of occupying their sexuality and offering sexual acts to gain access to positions of power. Compared to studies of men running for the same public office, it is evident that attacks against women are mostly focused on the character of the person and are less likely to include facts.

To begin to analyze this phenomenon, we must go to the basis of the discrimination and bias that affects women in politics, both online and offline, specifically in how we characterize women compared to men. The types of names and/or adjectives we use to describe women are not the same as those we use to describe men, and in some cases the same attitudes are characterized in the opposite way. For example, if a woman «says about» a topic or content, in a man it can be characterized as «knowledgeable» or «passionate». It is in these examples that the differentiations and biases begin, which have become even more detrimental with the new technology that exists.

There are several analysis axes where we can see that new technology is making it easier to “weaponize” these attacks. There is a relationship with technology that aims to silence women in order to erode democracy. Gender is the favorite topic of authoritarian leaders and actors in society who seek to roll back the progress made by organized groups of women and minority groups who hold them accountable for representing them and accuse them of corruption.

Special attention needs to be paid to digital platforms and algorithms that facilitate, reward and amplify hate speech to earn resources and money, so they cannot be left out of the equation. This is evidenced by the latest leaks of private information on Facebook, when the former employee of this platform Frances Haugen exposed that the platform contains special rules for «VIP clients», an example of this is the case of the Brazilian soccer player Neymar who has 150 million followers on Instagram and who was accused of rape in 2019. After what happened, the player uploaded the conversations and private messages (along with intimate photos of the victim) to his Instagram stories, defending himself and «proving» his innocence.

On the other hand, the journalist María Ressa, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, has been the victim of hate attacks where language has formed new terms to classify. “Presstitute”, a play on words between prostitute and press in English, has been used to devalue both her person and her work as a reporter in misogynistic and racist ways.

Study cases. Examples.

In Brazil, an opposition candidate to Jair Bolsonaro, an Afro-descendant who was murdered, continued to be a victim of disinformation and fake news after her death and this was on the rise, as news began to emerge that associated her with prostitution, drug trafficking and drugs. This news justified her death through these associations and blamed her supposed personal behavior as the reason for her death, instead of considering her political activity.

In Italy, Laura Boldrini constantly faces intimidation, threats of rape and death. She has tried to contact Facebook directly so that the platform interferes and even deletes posts within her social networks to stop this phenomenon. These threats continue on her Facebook page and this platform has not interfered with the hate speech she constantly receives.

In #ShePersisted, the work was done to document the experiences of these women in social media, where disinformation was observed as a common phenomenon.

Likewise, a very sexist atmosphere and approach has been created. «Deep Fakes» or «ultrafake», being this a false news that has used technological mechanisms to make it seem true, is used mostly as a mechanism to attack women, since 90% of all deepfakes that are circulating have as main protagonists women in scenarios of non-consensual pornography. The German chancellor candidate Annalena Baerbock suffered an episode in which a photo was leaked in which she supposedly came out showing her breasts, which was later proven to be false. This directly affected her candidacy from the beginning and it was speculated that she was not qualified for the position, having 5 times more fake news than the rest of her opponents.

In Canada, the former environment minister was likened to an “environmental Barbie”, using this photo to suppress her efforts and agenda towards clean energy. This caused her to escalate the threat against her, assigning her higher security for risk of violence.

On the other hand, the Istanbul convention, a legislative project for the protection against violence against women, became a controversial event when political groups from Hungary and Poland began to change the narrative to attack women’s rights activists and discredit the instrument speculating that it was part of a sexual minority agenda. These groups are even rewriting the way gender is talked about.

Communication tips and coalition building strategies against disinformation.

Never massify a false statement. This rule is very difficult to apply since, in order to become aware of the phenomenon, these news must be shown at the same time to show what its components are. The simple fact of showing this news harms the population’s perception of women and their leadership abilities. You must learn how to divert attention from this news: each like, comment and shared news programs the algorithm to show it to a greater number of people. It is necessary to influence and encourage the spread of true and relevant news even when you want to denounce false news.
Evaluate what type of information is being spread and the impact it may have. Are they real people who are watching it? Will it directly affect votes, reputation, support, speech, among others? Will it affect me in the medium or long term? Who are the actors?, etc. These factors must be categorized and the conversation must be redirected in a positive way about the achievements and plans that a certain woman in politics may have.
Focus on what you can control on these platforms and news. Each user must develop a strategy within their social media. Share news that is in accordance with the principles, in a positive way and that is verified.
Build a community that supports and amplifies verified news. Help activists build platforms that promote these principles by sharing them online with their clearinghouses and agendas, empowering us to continue promoting these values.
Denouncing sexism on social media is important to change the perception that people have around this issue. Ignoring this matter does not solve the problem, normalizing behaviors that should be directed as a public and political figure towards their voters. Being authentic and emphasizing the severity of the problem and why it is harmful to democracy does solve the problem.
Hold social media platforms and digital platforms accountable for providing the medium for hate speech and disinformation.

Capacity Building Sessions 2

Role of Personal Data Authorities in the Dissemination of Information in the Media. Romina Garrido, Master in Law of New Technologies, University of Chile

There is a personal data protection control principle, where types of control are evident: External Control, Own Control, Self-control or Internal Control, and Self-regulation.

In the external control or supervisory authority are the public bodies that supervise the application of the data protection law, guaranteeing the rights of people, supervising, sanctioning or urging compliance with the law.

There is a first generation of rights that refer to who has access to the data and what it is used for, and how you can oppose certain treatment. In this set is the Right of access, Right of rectification, Right of cancellation and the Right to opposition.

These new rights stress the right of expression and honor (and to be forgotten). There is a confrontation between data protection versus freedom of expression, framed in the following rights: Right to honor, Right to one’s family and Right to privacy.

In Chile, the law provides for free data processing, but this in turn has its limits. The Internet is causing these limits, set by law, to have certain nuances, such as how long you must be online. It is necessary to establish protection criteria so that the information that is disseminated does not affect the honor of the people, nor their privacy, since giving an opinion is not the same as informing.

False but diligently obtained information is lawful information. It may not justify where it is obtained from and must be rectified in the future. Erroneous, unverified information is illicit information and no type of lawful information protects humiliation or insulting acts.

Some rules for journalism that contain personal data weigh the public relevance of personal data and consider the people affected by the newsworthy event. The use of the Internet forces us to think about new limits, to think about the privacy of people, that personal data presented in the media contribute to the facts, not that they are disseminated for other reasons.

When we talk about the information that we publish on social media or other internet platforms, we must understand that this information is kept within this medium. The updating and exponential disclosure of information is good for the right to information, but they are practices directly proportional to the privacy of people and the damage that can be generated. That is why it is important to reflect on the importance of permanently keeping information online.

Right to be forgotten

We have the right to oppose the right to use past information when it is reputational, anachronistic, honor-threatening, redundant, irrelevant, and so as not to obscure the person’s current perception.

Thanks to the right to be forgotten we can suppress data on the internet under these conditions and it is intended to remake the image that others have of the person when certain facts on the internet harm them. The requirements and parameters to apply the right to be forgotten and/or delete our personal information online are that this Information is lawful and/or true, that it directly affects the person, that a reasonable time has already passed, that its affectation is disproportionate and has no historical relevance.

Actors in the management of the right to be forgotten are:

Holder: affected by the information;
Who manages the content: disseminates the information;
Search engine: it makes it easier for us to access information;
Internet user: those who want to access information.

In Europe the regulation of the right to be forgotten in relation to search engines is different, in this search engines that profit from the activity of displaying information are regulated. They consider that search engines do not make everything automatic, since they personalize the content and offer paid spaces where one information circulates before another. In Latin America, search engines are not responsible, since they are based on mere transmission and are not responsible for what is published.

The right to be forgotten is not new, but it must be raised from digital rights. As a society, we need to reflect on the digital backpack and understand that we are responsible for what we publish on the internet. Therefore, the following questions must be asked to reframe the problem:

Do we have the right to leave behind aspects of our lives?
What happens to the information that is permanently on the internet?
Is it known the limitation that there is for the treatment that the media do to broadcast information?
When is there a conflict between freedom of information, honor and privacy?

Presentation of iconic cases related to this theme. Regarding the use of personal data by the press, Channel 13 broadcast the crime of Nabila Rifo. Gender crime in a city in southern Chile. During the investigations, her gynecological report was read on television. This was questioned since there was an informative desire to present this information, but it is of a confidential and medical nature. On the other hand, on the right to be forgotten, Herval Abreu case for sexual harassment and Abbot for corruption

Final Tips

What is put on the internet is one’s own heritage and one must be able to set one’s own limits;
Have limits on the type of information to be shared. For example: who appears, what they say, why it is being shared, etc;
Behind the platforms, there is a business model that is perverse and incomprehensible, and that seeks data to continue operating and selling;
There is a lot to regulate in terms of platforms. You must be able to establish standards of self-care and digital hygiene;
A responsible digital footprint must be left, ensuring that each one has control of the information when sharing it;
The platforms must pay more attention and provide us with services of this type;
Think about the new ways of deleting information and how to stop direct and public access to it;
Be aware of the repercussions of content on the internet.

Academia Strategies to Combat Disinformation. Patricia Reyes, Doctor in Communication, Right to Information and Ethics

The right to information is an inherent, indissoluble and inseparable right to the human condition, universally recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other documents.

Right to investigate, receive and disseminate all kinds of information and opinions, as well as not to do so. The power to receive information entails the possibility for every individual to receive or obtain information, without restrictions, obstacles or justified objections. For Desanter Guanter, this right requires conditions: “the information you receive must be truthful, complete, timely and equally accessible to all”.

Tools

Development of critical thinking and promotion of intellectual curiosity and access to knowledge. Awareness of validating information sources, reviewing and seeing their veracity as their sources of information.
Training of information skills: Know when and why they need information, where to find it, how to evaluate it, use it and communicate in an ethical manner, as there is also information illiteracy, where training should be created on the use of these platforms: what to use it for and how to use it.
Training in Human Rights: Equality, freedom of expression, privacy and honor, right of access to public information and protection of personal data.
Gender, equality and diversity units: Establish protocols for denouncing violence and “demasculinizing” the academy in the positioning of academic women in the conversation (for example, UV Mujeres platform).
Proactive attitude in the fight against disinformation: Critical position against acts of disinformation and defense of rights that are especially affected historically in vulnerable groups. This work translates into participation in networks. Academic studies cannot be made invisible.

Examples

Construction of protocols within the university to deal with the problem of disinformation within the academic group. The relationship may be subject to an asymmetry that must be known and acted upon when evaluating the relationships between students, teachers and workers. It works at the University of Valparaíso as a complaint that is evaluated by a technical commission that evaluates the veracity to then apply administrative measures and the course of an investigation together with accompanying measures.
Concern and action against disinformation, defense of violent acts, and orders. Conscious action must be taken in these matters, changing the narrative regarding the role played, for example, by gender chairs at the university.
Women’s Observatory against Disinformation and Fake News in partnership with Fundación Multitudes and Universidad de Valparaiso.

Media Strategies to Combat Disinformation. Sebastián Rivas, General Audience Editor of the Copesa Group

The work of the media to counteract disinformation is a complex task that must start with three principles:

A media outlet, from the most modern perspective of the press, has a responsibility to combat disinformation and not intentionally feed it as a minimum floor.
A media outlet has a process to check what it publishes. Errors may occur in the process, but the goal will always be to obtain more accurate, precise and true information.
Beyond the editorial line that the media may have and the interpretations or analyzes that it may make on the scenarios, a media outlet stakes its reputation on the fact that the information is correct and corresponds to true facts.

The journalistic check process

There must be a direct and valid source that delivers the information. It is not enough for another outlet to publish a piece of information, if it has not been personally corroborated, it cannot be published, because if there is an error it becomes part of it.

The data must be delivered identifying where it comes from, either with direct quotes (on) or, if the issuer cannot be revealed, with enough references to understand where the information comes from (off).

Unless they are official accounts, social media are not valid sources on their own. They are inputs, but information cannot be considered valid just because someone published information.

Modern challenges

Disinformation is advancing fast and out of sight: through targeted campaigns on Facebook, through WhatsApp chains. There are monetization strategies or ideologies in which it doesn’t matter what content is being disseminated is true and, at the same time, the media is publishing information at a dizzying pace.

The amount of information circulating makes errors more frequent, and it is the task of the media to develop ways to deal with this situation.

How does the media face this challenge? There are layers of work: journalists and editors. Ideally, the process should allow for pre-publication reviews and go through multiple filters. Apply the principle of abstention, which is that when in doubt it is better not to publish and recheck.

The rectification procedure: how to communicate a relevant update or modification in already published content. However, despite all these layers, the media are in a permanent cycle of revision due to errors in the processes or in the information itself.

Within the «gray areas» of the conversation, it must be shown that a publication is not always fake news. The abuse of the concept can generate confusion in the public, since it generally has an intention and is going to be a lie beyond the possible existing interpretations. In many cases, more so in current times, there are technical failures or errors that go beyond journalistic conditions: opinion and analysis is not the same as information.

Conference 3: Social Media as the Ideal Incubator for Disinformation

Social Media as an Ideal Incubator for Disinformation in Electoral Processes. Luiza Bandeira, Researcher and Editor at the Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Research Laboratory

DFRLab’s main idea is to identify, expose and explain disinformation, how it is amplified and what are the processes involved. They work with three main axes that interrelate with each other: Democracy, security and technology. The methodology is to work with open data available on the internet: images of conflicts with geolocation and satellites to verify the information; verify what the characteristics are to identify if a profile is real or not (page source code). From this, quantitative data is taken and studied under qualitative axes to identify these problems at a social level.

Regarding social media as incubators of disinformation, it should be noted that disinformation is not only on these platforms, the environment and the context also affect the spread of this phenomenon. In the first place, there are millions of users who consume and produce information, this can be very positive for access to information as it is very detrimental to privacy. The algorithms privilege publications that generate interaction, so this becomes the purpose, at the same time that the algorithm allows «microtargeting» to specific groups, referring to the fact that information can be classified and directed to multiple preselected groups. Finally, social media are cheap and in turn monetize the publications, thus encouraging their use.

As for the concepts to take into account, there is «disinformation» versus «misinformation», where the harmful intention of disinformation is not misinformation, which has an intention from ignorance rather than harming personally; fake news, which is used less and less as a concept given the negative connotation that has been given to it; hate speech and harassment; and propaganda.

Regarding the behavior of disinformation, on many occasions the content of the news is studied and it is filtered by its veracity, but where this interaction in the publications comes from is not studied. Bots are false and/or duplicate accounts that intervene in the behavior of news on social media. This has been evidenced in the rapid overcrowding on the WhatsApp platform.

Some actors that may be behind these influence operations or information operations in disinformation campaigns are politicians, political marketing companies, PR (public relations), governments and foreign actors.

As for Latin America and the Caribbean, fake profiles with false or erroneous information have been observed that were duplicated specifically on domestic news, with topics such as politics, activism, and criticism of political candidates during election time. The Facebook platform removed these news items with this type of information and with accounts with these characteristics.

Regarding what should be done in the face of the phenomenon of disinformation, bots and influence operations, there are general guidelines such as making the problem of deformation known, showing it as a phenomenon that does exist and is real, but at the same time without perpetuating it narrative; fact checking (review information) and debunking (verification prior to publication); innovate in social media and search for platforms to influence the community; and make visible the victims most affected by this phenomenon: minority groups, indigenous people, women, migrants, LGBTQ+, etc.

Safeguards on Social Media to Prevent Disinformation. Heloisa Massaro, InternetLab Researcher

To establish what are the elements that help to identify and combat disinformation used as a form of gender violence in social media during electoral processes, it is necessary to define two concepts. First, political violence refers to any action, conduct or omission of a physical, sexual, psychological, moral, economic or symbolic nature, which damages or annuls the environment, exercise and recognition of political rights. When it is directed towards women, it comes into contact with concepts such as misogyny and hate speech. Second, disinformation is a controversial and multifaceted concept; it is an intricate informational phenomenon that relates the transformations of digital communication together with specific socio-political dynamics. In general, we can refer to disinformation as misleading content that is also presented as truthful and trustworthy, both journalistic and scientific, but whose production lacks elements present in a journalistic and/or scientific paradigm.

InternetLab, carried out a journalistic collaboration research program, which aimed to search for key elements to identify gender violence within social media. MonitorA is an observatory of gender political violence in social media in Brazil, which is based on the understanding that political violence is an important social phenomenon that deserves attention. The goal is to demonstrate, in a concrete way, that online political violence is directed towards women in most cases.

The project identifies empirical evidence of violence that affects women, especially black and/or Afro-descendant women, trans women and members of the LBGTQ+ community, among others, creating barriers to obstruct female representation in political institutional spaces.

The results of this investigation, after the analysis of multiple platforms (Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, etc.) with hundreds of publications collected, were the following:

Political violence is directed with greater intensity and recurrence at female profiles, with allusions to their bodies, intelligence (capacity) and moral aspects. Moral offenses, «fatphobia» (discrimination against fat people) and «bad reputation» were the three topics most mentioned by the candidates.
During the second electoral round in Brazil, these dynamics gained new edges and attacks against women candidates: the same supporters/voters became targets of gender violence.
Racism operates in different facets. For example, for Benedita da Silva (PT), an animalization of her body was made, rejection and disbelief of her racial identity, and direct parameters were established between black skin and ugliness.
The rejection or phobia of members of the transsexual community (transphobia) was also presented in the speeches, denying them their gender identity and redirecting the conversation, forcing the biologization of bodies.
We observe that men, with the exception of gay, transgender and elderly groups, are considered mostly as bad managers or ideologically mistaken, unlike women in general they are offended for who they are, not for their actions as candidates or their political actions and ideology as in the case of men.

Within the study, gender disinformation has been mapped in the narratives of social media. These narratives are used to support existing structures of oppression and inequality, they are difficult to verify as disinformation or not.

Some narratives that public actors use are found in the “grey area” between information and disinformation. These narratives can incite violence from their followers in subsequent comments. Disinformation appears both as a strategy to support violence and oppression, as well as a type of narrative aimed at specifically attacking women.

Safeguards and recommendations

Information about social media policies: General community guidelines (hate speech, bullying, disinformation, etc.), content moderation, election integrity policies, and comment moderation tools.
Avoid the amplification and oxygenation of these publications: Occupy silence as a strategy, omission of potentially harmful content; strategic massification, dissemination of ethical and responsible content; and minimize the damage, evaluating the positive and negative impact that the publicity of violent and extremist episodes can have.
Report abusive behavior in official information channels (government platforms for example).
Save evidence of violence and/or intimidation.
Being in constant contact between fact checkers, who help share true and proven information.
Avoid answering or getting into an argument with actors who seek to start hate speech and fights (bots/trolls).

Some recommendations addressed to the platforms are:

Include hate speech in electoral integrity policies. In order to ensure the internal visibility of the phenomenon and focus on solving this type of problem during the election period.
Facilitate reporting. Create simple mechanisms to prevent victims from having to report item after item cumbersomely. This becomes impossible in cases of massive attacks or when there is a high volume of attacks.
Invest in moderation activities, providing faster and more appropriate responses to reported incidents.
Be transparent about the procedures they are reporting. Why the content has been removed, who has reported it and what is the possibility of appeal.
Offer transparency in reporting or when removing specific content during the election period.
Promote awareness of campaigns against online political violence, emphasizing the consequences of each practice, inside and outside the platforms.

Capacity Building Sessions 3

Public Participation to Improve Community Engagement. Katya Petrikevich, Co-founder and International Director of Participation Factory

Public participation is the commitment that a specific group has, with the goal of collecting and creating information together. Traditionally, advocacy campaigns, planning and decision-making are carried out in relation to what is called “technical data” that comes from experts, statistics or studies which operate on a limited basis. This leaves out a whole base of what was called “living data» that comes directly from citizens and the experiences of communities that cannot be accessed from technical data. These experiences are often left aside and downplayed at the time of decision making.

The «live data» has multiple layers of analysis, first of all there is the general public considered as the least valued for not having the qualifications or the expertise to be included in the conversation, especially in public decisions and the elaboration of strategies. This is contradictory when we think that it is exactly the public who are the experts in being the members of their communities and the beneficiaries of the actions that are being carried out. This is why it is important to include them and inform them about the decisions that are being made and to co-design or co-decide to generate sustainable measures over time.

On the other hand, we have communities with greater participation over time, NGOs, organizations and companies that have an agenda in mind and that can be facilitators of the participation process, reaching a greater number of people, capitalizing on or overcoming some limitations. existing, with the aim of empowering the population.

The last group are experts, academics and those who are ultimately invited to participate in decision-making and do not include a representative percentage of the population, nor the benefits of a more heterogeneous group with multiple representatives.

Citizen participation aims to bring more inclusion to the discussion, create a space of belonging and democratization, especially when we talk about groups that have been historically marginalized and not included in decision-making. Also, there is a high level of transparency and trust in public institutions as well as among civil society groups, since it makes people more involved in decision-making. Gathering a heterogeneous group is already valuable in itself and as an experience when analyzing the perspective and where each person within the group comes from.

Living data identifies real and immediate needs, much of the decision making is made on the basis of incomplete data as well as assumptions of people’s needs. The good intention of creating public policies that help these groups is often not what people necessarily need, nor is it fully understanding the particular reality of a specific context. This is why having a heterogeneity of people and groups can help to understand, conceptualize and imagine the problems that other groups do not problematize or will understand based on their experiences.

This is intended to create better results and products in decision-making, create higher satisfaction rates and, in general, greater satisfaction in democratic processes and participation in public institutions.

To achieve heterogeneous participation, we must start from the base and introduce them to participation processes, encouraging their voices to be heard and that they are important. There are five basic levels of public participation:

Inform: Provide people with the basics about participation, be transparent, keep them updated and informed. Communicate and provide tools.
Consult: Get feedback and recognize the importance of their experiences.
Involve: Involve and invite to design specific objectives with a common goal.
Collaborate: Invite groups to fully associate themselves with the initiatives and co-design solutions, creating new aspects without there being an asymmetry of who has the power in making decisions.
Empower: Invite groups and individuals to make decisions for themselves or as part of the community to which they belong, to vote for the best solution that they consider pertinent, delegating power to individuals.

These levels start from a low level of participation and commitment to a sophisticated level of symmetry and involvement.

Examples

Constitutional Assembly of Iceland (2011): 25 Icelandic citizens to write a new constitution in 2009. Tools and platforms such as social media, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, among others, were used, using crowdsourcing for the first time as a method of constitutional review. Products such as information articles on rights, the role of parliament and the properties of Iceland’s natural resources were created.
Citizens’ Dialogue on Canada’s Energy Future (2017-2018): 150 Canadian citizens were randomly selected and through the deliberate dialogue process worked together and heard different opinions and perspectives. They reached compromises and compromises on the recommendations they were going to present for the future in energy Canada.
Participatory budgeting and the inclusion of people with disabilities in Glasgow, Scotland (since 2014): Following a change in political dynamics, a referendum was assigned to promote national identity and counter child poverty levels in the Calton district, where special emphasis was placed on historically marginalized groups such as people with disabilities, who within this initiative were able to develop a specific social program to meet their needs and experiences.
Future of Europe Conference: 800 European citizens were invited to discuss Europe’s challenges and priorities. This was carried out on a multilingual platform, providing a space for requests to be sent and for these to be collected, analyzed, monitored and published throughout the conference. Locations and events were decentralized, discussion panels and final plenaries were created.

Participation tools: Qualitative research, quantitative research, focus groups, public meetings, participation mapping, communication strategies, use of digital platforms, data analysis, among others.

Civic Tech, unlike Gov Tech, focuses on citizens as direct beneficiaries of the initiative. Citizenship and not operations or results are placed at the center of the conversation. It seeks to achieve commitment and sustainability with the communities, not necessarily achieving efficiency in decision-making. Some types can be the result of: Surveys or polls, questionnaires and voting, feedback, mapping (data visualization and analysis), information dissemination, rapid communication and co-creation.

TechCamp Chile Achievement Report

Mediators: Patricia Reyes, Doctor in Communication, Right to Information and Ethics; and Sebastian Rivas, Audience General Editor of the Copesa Group

TechCamp participants made various proposals to be implemented beyond the program to combat disinformation, such as starting collaborative work, seeking collective solutions and supporting advocacy in all aspects within civil society, academics, media of communication, etc., implement studies in multiple regions and countries with the purpose of finding solutions, similarities and differences to combat this problem. This must be done by creating a digital, responsible and ethical space.

On the other hand, it was proposed to carry out content analysis and studies on the effect of disinformation on the population, especially in socially validated media. «Info – intoxication» as a new concept to represent the excessive amount of information to which one is constantly exposed. Verify and verify the media in which one is being informed: where it is created, who creates it, to whom the information is directed and who ends up receiving the information.

Likewise, it was established as a proposal to improve the limited access that social sciences have to «big data» to obtain relevant information for the analysis of communication trends. This shows the abysmal asymmetry of power within civil society groups and large corporations.

One of the suggestions that most of the participants agreed with was to democratize science and technology through education and teaching in parallel with the punitive control measures that are being implemented on online platforms. Grant the necessary measures and tools to educate the population, evaluating the particularities of each community, promoting, from civil society, an approach to public information.

It was proposed to study access to information from a «multilayer» approach: access to technological equipment, access to education on how to use the different platforms, access to reliable information, being able to identify a source and reliable news, among others.

The participants suggested establishing participatory platforms in order to include historically excluded groups (women, indigenous peoples, rural populations, LGBTQ+ groups) and to do so in connection with civil society groups to facilitate communication and participation. Bring people closer to technological platforms that are used in citizen participation and decision-making events.

Holding the media responsible for the content and the negative exposure that disinformation has on the population, as well as the platforms used to disseminate information, was a proposal in which the participants agreed.

Analyzing gender violence in the media and social networks, in order to mitigate the negative effects it has on the participation of women in decision-making positions, was a relevant approach.

Another relevant proposal was to create platforms on how to prevent and combat disinformation, maintaining up-to-date information for the use of all the actors on this platform and providing tools for common use.

Likewise, generating more instances of conversation and discussion to educate the population about what disinformation is and the difference with misinformation, fake news, etc. so that they can be included in the analyzes and conversations, was recognized as a key measure to be implemented.

Regarding the democratic participation of women, it was proposed to include in all educational levels content related to how to prevent and combat disinformation, so that from an early age the population has the appropriate knowledge and tools to avoid the exclusion of women in decision-making processes and the subsequent democratic backsliding.

The importance of denormalizing disinformation within social media and at the same time preventing the spread of false news in the exercise of issuing opinions and informing was recognized.

The importance of recognizing our digital “backpack” or “footprint” was established, recognizing ourselves as digital natives, identifying how we are consuming and what we are producing and sharing in order to be able to understand the communication strategies that are behind disinformation and this paradigm anchored in the actual society.

Regarding disinformation, it was established that its axis should be identified, as a gender, political, social phenomenon, among others. A dogmatic analysis is needed to then begin to identify how to sanction them within the criminal sphere: which organizations are going to be involved, how we regulate it, how to repair the victims, etc. Also identify how we are going to include these issues to the institutional framework as a guarantor body within the constitution.

Finally, constantly updating the information on the new platforms that are emerging and on which you interact, encourages you to keep the processes and places where disinformation occurs up to date, in order to later have the tools to counteract them.

TechCamp Chile Exit Survey Report

At the end of TechCamp Chile, both participants and trainers were asked to answer an exit survey to evaluate the impact, challenges and achievements that this activity achieved in the fight against disinformation. This survey was implemented voluntarily, obtaining a total of 15 responses, 11 from participants and 4 from trainers.

The main challenge that came to the interior of the multiple organizations in which the members of TechCamp Chile belong, after the conferences and capacity building sessions, was the dimension of gender, technological education, access to information and participation of groups historically vulnerable.

“Make visible and generate awareness of how disinformation affects the daily life of society, but in particular, of women and dissidents who are the ones most affected by this phenomenon. […] Organizations of women and feminists, as well as journalists, activists and human rights defenders are at permanent risk, therefore, shared strategies to deal with disinformation are key. Today, access to information is vital for citizens and pato strengthen democracy.”

Based on these challenges to overcome, thanks to the enriching experiences and conversations of multiple members of society in this learning instance, they were asked what they consider to be the achievement of TechCamp Chile. To this, they responded about the learning they had from the multiple perspectives of society. From the media to the academy, from access to information to public participation, the ability to «become more aware of how disinformation impacts us, even in our daily lives, understanding some aspects of which I did not have as much information as the construction of narratives and phenomena of inequality in today’s world”.

They also valued the instance as a means to «learn perspectives, engage in dialogue, generate contact networks and obtain new information regarding this growing phenomenon», emphasizing the importance of creating new instances of exchanging experiences on this phenomenon and creating a network that promotes these subjects.

Based on this, initiatives were recommended to be implemented after the first TechCamp Chile event

Extend the invitation to other areas of development.
Build a network of those who participated in the TechCamp and generate other instances of information/knowledge transfer that empower them in these matters.
Create a simple guide that provides basic and minimal information on how to deal with disinformation, a repository of good practices with tools and methods to combat disinformation and, finally, reflection and analysis sessions in electoral contexts and, in the case of Chile, with the constituent process.
Prepare a guide to implement in schools with basic notions on the subject in an accessible language for all ages.
Data analysis workshop to investigate disinformation processes.
Continuation of dialogue and conversations throughout Latin America, specifically with those who have an interest in strengthening its sociopolitical structure and promoting greater participation by its citizens.
Share experiences on the subject in other areas of the problem: development of more specialized capacities aimed at those who directly manage social networks and others for the programmatic part.